H-JAPAN (E): Responses, review of Decision to Use A-bomb

Sun, 10 Nov 1996 03:22:04 -0500
      (Written by Katie Morris.)
 			      November 10, 1996
 (Editor's note:  This is the second part of Katie Morris's comments on
 John Bonnett's review.  Part I appeared on Nov. 9.)
 Part II.
 So far, I have just barely touched on the evidence documenting the
 thinking of civilian leaders on these issues.  In presenting this
 evidence, I would like to pick up where I left off yesterday,
 that is, with the point that to understand the options as U.S.
 leaders understood them, one must look carefully at evidence from
 the period before the bomb was a sure thing when U.S. leaders
 explored the other strategic options available to them.  Yesterday
 I presented evidence which confirms that during this period, while
 invasion planning and continued blockade and
 bombardment went forward, military leaders determined that Soviet
 entry into the war, which they expected to occur approximately
 three months before the scheduled start of the invasion,
 would quite possibly be decisive; and, that if it were paired with
 a clarification of unconditional surrender with regard to the
 emperor, "surrender might follow fairly quickly."  As for civilian
 leaders, although they did not view things strictly from the
 military point of view, many of those who had their hands in
 Pacific War strategy and planning seem to have been thinking in
 similar terms.  Today I would like to review some of the evidence
 on their views as well as to offer a few general comments on this
 discussion and the state of the bomb debate.
      John Bonnett claimed early on in this discussion that
 "American civilian and military policy makers understood that
 Japan's objections to unconditional surrender centred on foreign
 occupation as well [as on the emperor's status]," and that U.S.
 leaders were not encouraged, in fact, were discouraged by what they
 read in the MAGIC intercepts.  However, the available
 evidence suggests that this is not quite right. For example, when,
 on June 29, Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy forwarded a
 draft of what became the Potsdam Proclamation to
 Stimson, he highlighted some of the "more important questions"
 which had "been resolved in the manner set forward in the draft"
      The maintenance of the dynasty.  This point seems to be the
 most controversial one and one on which there is a split in opinion
 in the State Department.  The draft suggests the language we have
 used in the memorandum to the President.  This may cause
 repercussions at home but without it those who seem to know most
 about Japan feel there would be very little likelihood of
 In contrast with Bonnett's characterization however, with regard to
 "the necessity of occupation," McCloy noted only that "We have felt
 that without occupation there would not be the symbol of defeat
 that is necessary to impress both the Japanese and the Far Eastern
 nor the means to demilitarize the islands.  As you will see, we
 have left the time for the occupation somewhat indefinite."(1)
      Also worth noting is the second memorandum McCloy sent to
 Stimson with the proclamation draft, which addressed the matter of
 the timing of the issuance of this
 proclamation, and which is significant here for two reasons: one,
 because it is an example of the planning that was done without
 reference to the bomb, and two, because it suggests that
 totally apart from the bomb, Soviet entry was thought of as the key
 decisive factor, set to take place months before the invasion,
 which might provide the means for ending the war without
 an invasion.  Not considering the bomb, the joint sub-committee
 that had prepared the draft believed "the best time would be
 immediately after Russia's entry into the war particularly if this
 event coincided with our buildup in the Pacific both air and ground
 and the approaching peak of the bombardment operations."(2) (Again,
 reflecting the two-step logic that "The entry of the
 U.S.S.R. into the war would, together with the foregoing factors,
 convince most Japanese at once of the inevitability of complete
 defeat," and "If ... the Japanese people, as well as their
 leaders, were persuaded both that absolute defeat was inevitable
 and that unconditional surrender did not imply national
 annihilation, surrender might follow fairly quickly.")
      Stimson himself attempted three times in three weeks, with the
 support of Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew and Secretary of
 the Navy James Forrestal, to persuade Truman
 to clarify the meaning of unconditional surrender with regard to
 the status of the emperor.
 Again, because I fear that this evidence has been quoted so much
 that it has lost it's punch, I ask you to consider that: On July 2,
 in a memorandum to Truman, Stimson first proposed that
 a warning with assurances be issued.  Almost echoing Leahy, Stimson
 rhetorically asked, "Is there any alternative to such a forceful
 occupation of Japan which will secure for us the
 equivalent of an unconditional surrender of her forces and a
 permanent destruction of her power again to strike an aggressive
 blow at the 'peace of the Pacific'?"  He answered: "I am inclined
 to think that there is enough such chance to make it well
 worthwhile our giving them a warning of what is to come and a
 definite opportunity to capitulate."  He emphasized: "I believe
 Japan is susceptible to reason in such a crisis to a much greater
 extent than is indicated by our current press and other current
 comment."  And driving home the point McCloy had made, (probably
 in anticipation of any fears the president might have of domestic
 disapproval of assurances) he stressed his belief that if, in the
 warning, "we should add that we do not exclude a constitutional
 monarchy under her present dynasty, it would substantially add to
 the chances of acceptance."(3)
      Also, various diary entries, correspondence and papers confirm
 that the content of the July 12 and 13 MAGIC intercepts triggered
 Stimson's July 16 attempt to convince Truman that
 "we are at the psychological moment" to issue an ultimatum to Japan
 clarifying U.S. intentions vis a vis the emperor--and to use the
 bombs only if this did not work.  In an official
 memorandum, he explained:
      The great marshalling of our new air and land forces in the
 combat area in the midst of the ever greater blows she is receiving
 from the naval and already established Army forces, is bound to
 provoke thought even among their military leaders.  Added to this
 is the effect induced by this Conference and the impending threat
 of Russia's participation, which it accentuates.
           Moreover, the recent news of attempted approaches on the
 part of Japan to Russia, impels me to urge prompt delivery of our
 Again, to be quite clear, despite what Japanese sources reveal
 about the intransigence of Japanese military leaders, it was
 Stimson's view, as expressed here to Truman, that the
 desperate situation in the Pacific was "bound to provoke thought
 _even among their military leaders_."
      Even Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, to whom Bonnett
 makes specific reference to support his argument that U.S. leaders
 believed the Japanese were as much concerned about
 occupation as they were about the emperor, supported Stimson's
 efforts and, as _The Decision_ documents and others here have
 noted, may have supported (even encouraged?) the efforts of
 Ralph Bard and Admiral Ellis Zacharias.(5)  Indeed, in terms of
 perceptions, the July 30 entry of McCloy's diary is quite clear: On
 that day, Ambassador to Moscow Averell Harriman told
 McCloy about the "long talk . . . about the Japanese business,
 particularly the Emperor's position," that he had had with
 Forrestal. From McCloy we learn that:
      Jim [Forrestal] feels we may need the Emperor to stabilize
 things in Japan and bring about peace on the continent.  If the
 Emperor does not go along with what we feel is a
      complete demobilization of Japan, we can unseat him.  If he
 does, he may be an asset to a liberal element.(6)
 And, Forrestal made a special effort to take the latest intercepts
 with him when he dropped in on the conference at Potsdam.
      I present this evidence, aware of the fact that it has been
 categorically dismissed on the grounds that these advisors were
 "outgunned," for several reasons.
      1. The fact that they were not in the position to make the
 final decision on what went into the Potsdam Proclamation does not
 diminish the fact that they, as top members of the Truman
 Administration, with access to the most current information coming
 from Japan, believed that the emperor's status was, above all, the
 critical condition for Japan, _and_ that assuring them
 on this matter was well within the of U.S. war aims;
      2. They were not so outgunned that they did not advise Truman
 of this judgment;(7)
 Here I would like to stress several points: As noted above, General
 Marshall was not against assuring the Japanese that they could keep
 the emperor and it is wrong for Bergerud and Villa
 to continue to argue that he did.  Also, it is no less than
 misrepresentation to suggest that MacLeish, Acheson, Hopkins,
 Bohlen, Harriman and Hull held more weight than Marshall,
 Leahy, the Joint Chiefs as a body, Stimson, Forrestal, Grew, even
 McCloy who basically ran the war department for Stimson and
 Undersecretary of the navy who sat on the Interim
 Committee; and to claim that the views of the former constituted
 the "political flow inside [Truman's] administration."(8)
      3. The evidence documenting where they met opposition does not
 suggest that the opposition was either based on a belief that other
 conditions were necessary, or that allowing
 Japan to keep the emperor was incompatible with U.S. war aims.  For
 example, although we know that Truman approved the removal of both
 the military leaders' version of assurances and
 the civilian leaders' version of assurances from the Potsdam
 Proclamation, there is no evidence as to why.  Yet there is
 evidence that whenever the subject of the emperor's status was
 raised with him, he expressed support for clarification.(9)
 Moreover, when confronted on August 10 with the Japanese surrender
 offer on the sole condition that the sovereignty of the emperor be
 preserved, he did not hesitate in supporting a positive response.
 In fact, the evidence relating to this last point is worth noting
 in detail, for not only is it a good indication of the "political
 flow" inside the Truman administration, it also suggests that
 somehow Truman had little sense of the details of this matter:
      On August 10, when the initial Japanese surrender offer was
 received, a debate took place in the White House.  On one side was
 Leahy, Stimson, and Truman; on the other, Byrnes,
 with Forrestal agreeing with the former but occupying the middle
 ground.  Byrnes' assistant, Walter Brown's notes of the debate is
 enlightening.  According to Brown, Truman was perfectly
 willing to accept the offer outright, and immediately approved a
 cable drafted by Admiral Leahy.(10)  However, Brown notes that
 Byrnes found the cable unacceptable.  When he
 protested, arguing that because they had insisted on "unconditional
 surrender" before the atomic bombings and before Soviet entry, they
 should stick to it after, Brown reports that "Truman
 asked to see [the] statement." Brown details:
      JFB [Byrnes] cited page, paragraph and line of Potsdam
 declaration.  Forrestal spoke up for JFB's position.  Truman swung
 over. . . .(11)
      What is strange about this is that it suggests that despite an
 administration-wide debate over the issue, and the efforts of the
 all of the top-echelon advisers save James Byrnes to draw
 his attention to this very point--Truman was the only member of his
 administration to not have gotten the picture or refused to deal
 with the unconditional surrender problem--even Byrnes
 knew the page, paragraph and line of the Potsdam declaration that
 was at issue.  Yet one further detail from Brown's August 10 entry,
 offering a rare glimpse of the relationship between Byrnes
 and Truman at this time, suggests one possible explanation: In
 addition to the above, he also noted: "JFB had lunch with the
 president and said that the two of them had to decide the
 question and there could not be so many cooks.  Truman agreed and
 JFB message as written."(12)
      This suggests the possibility that information stopped with
 Byrnes or, at least, that the efforts to get the matter before
 Truman were somehow blocked.  Unfortunately, at this point,
 it is impossible to determine exactly what happened, but at the
 very least, it is clear that the evidence on the views of the one
 advisor who was not outgunned, James Byrnes, is critical.
 Yet, significantly, all of the evidence indicating his views--that
 he did not want to make any deals; that he did not want to invite
 negotiations or any trouble on the domestic front; that, in
 fact, he probably wanted to dictate terms and when reports of the
 success in New Mexico arrived at Potsdam he grew confident that the
 bomb would allow him to do so; and that even
 when things did not work out quite as he had hoped he insisted on
 calling the shots--confirms only that Byrnes wanted to and thought
 he could end the war without having to publicly assure
 the Japanese that Hirohito could stay.  Whether Byrnes' desire to
 get around this point can be used to explain the necessity of the
 bombings (especially when so many thought it possible, and
 when the JCS had taken account of political backlash and had
 suggested neutral language) is questionable.  However, what is at
 issue here is whether, from the American perspective, the
 status of the emperor was the critical condition, or that
 assurances would be effective, and with respect to this question it
 should be noted that none of the evidence on Byrnes' views proves
 that is was not.  For a sense of this, consider Stimson's
 characterization of the Japanese surrender
 offer, and his subsequent comments:
      Japan accepted the Potsdam list of terms put out by the
 President "with the understanding the said declaration does not
 comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of
 his majesty as a sovereign ruler".  It is curious that this
 was the very single point that I feared would make trouble.  When
 the Potsdam conditions were drawn and left my office where they
 originated, they contained a provision which permitted the
 continuance of the dynasty with certain conditions.  The President
 and Byrnes struck that out.  They  were not obdurate on it but
 thought they could arrange it in the necessary secret
 negotiations which would take place after any armistice.(13)
   Indeed, this and the other evidence on Byrnes' opposition to
 clarifying the U.S. position on the emperor in the Potsdam
 Proclamation lends considerable weight to the argument that to some
 the bomb was perceived as a panacea; and that the preference for
 this option resulted in less than careful attention to other,
 equally viable if less desirable, options by the men who,
 ultimately, were in the position to decide U.S. policy.
      This aside, what is absolutely clear, is that contrary to what
 has been implied by the critics of _The Decision_ who have written
 here, none of the available evidence even suggests
 that American leaders were basing their decisions on an accurate
 understanding of the specific positions held by the two sides in
 the Japanese cabinet, or that they read MAGIC to be saying
 that there were other conditions at stake or, even, peace was not
 far off.  In fact, though it may seem naive now, even a cursory
 look at the diaries and record of efforts of U.S. leaders reveals
 that as a result of what they read in July and August MAGIC
 intercepts reporting the emperor's intervention in the surrender
 process, U.S. leaders were increasingly confident that surrender
 was "imminent."  Consider just a few pieces of evidence that bear
 on this matter:  In response to news of the intercepts, and
 Hirohito's intervention in particular, McCloy wrote "Things are
 moving - what a long way we have come since that Sunday morning we
 heard the news of Pearl Harbor!"  Also, a day later, when Stimson
 could not find a chance to meet with Truman,
 McCloy was anxious because "the Japanese matter is _so_ pressing.
 There are so many things to do if the Japanese collapse should come
 suddenly...." (emphasis McCloy's.)  And offering
 insight into his position, the day after the Potsdam Proclamation
 was issued McCloy wrote "Maybe the Secretary's big bomb may not be
 dropped - the Japs had better hurry if they are to
 avoid it."(14)
      Walter Brown's diary states that Byrnes was "encouraged over
 early ending of Japanese war" after he received a copy of the
 intercepted cable from Churchill.(15)  And Truman, after
 meeting with Churchill on July 18 and discussing the "telegram from
 Jap emperor," was encouraged to "believe Japs will fold up before
 Russia comes in."(16)  Writing about this same
 meeting, Churchill recorded that he expressed his own view "that
 the Japanese war might end much quicker than had been expected,"
 and that he went so far as to comment that "Stage III,"
 or reconversion, "might be upon us in a few months, or perhaps even
 earlier."  Furthermore, he noted that "The President also thought
 the war might come to a speedy end."(17)  Indeed,
 as of August 3, after reviewing the latest intercepts, Truman seems
 to have been fairly confident that peace might not be far off.  On
 that day Brown recorded in his diary:
      Aboard Augusta/ president, Leahy, JFB agrred [sic] Japas [sic]
 looking for peace.
      (Leahy had another report from Pacific)  President afraid they
 will sue for peace through Russia instead of some country like
 Significantly, this evidence reveals that still three days before
 Hiroshima was bombed Truman was not expressing concern about an
 unending war, but rather about the problems that might
 arise if the Japanese were to surrender through Moscow.  However,
 aware, again, that this evidence will probably be questioned on the
 basis that Truman did nothing to indicate that he
 truly believed surrender was near, I add two points: one, that
 there is a significant difference between being hopeful and being
 certain.  I am arguing that the MAGIC intercepts encouraged
 U.S. hopes that Japan was getting closer to surrender on their own
 at just the time when the a-bomb order was going out.  This is
 distinguished from the argument that on the basis of what
 they read in MAGIC U.S. leaders were certain that the Japanese were
 about to surrender and therefore took action to begin closing up
 the war.  Yet, on this last point, there is other evidence
 which may explain why one does not find a flurry of activity in
 connection with re-conversion efforts, etc.  A July 25 memorandum
 from General Marshall to Truman, drawn up by War
 Department staff, assured the president that "Plans have been
 prepared for the occupation of Japan on short notice and necessary
 forces and resources are available in the Pacific." Among
 other details, the memorandum notes:
      75-80% of industries will not require reconversion, many
 wartime workers will leave industry, there is a tremendous deferred
 demand for maintenance and for consumer goods, those industries
 undergoing reconversion will still employ part of their labor
      force, and manpower resulting from demobilization is regulated
 by shipping capabilities.
      These factors together with the vigorous leadership of the
 President and other leaders tend to indicate that fears of
 widespread unemployment may be exaggerated.(19)
 This evidence is not hard to come by.  The ability to appreciate it
 and to place it within the context of the decision to use atomic
 bombs, however, requires nuanced understanding of U.S.
 policy debates and U.S. records.
 In closing, I would like to comment on John Bonnett's effort to
 explore a cognitive structures approach as a means for eliminating,
 or at least minimizing, the gridlock that characterizes bomb
 debates.  While I fully sympathize with Bonnett's obvious
 frustration with the limitations of bomb debates in general, I was
 again only disappointed with his selection of Secretary of War
 Henry Stimson as the analytical subject of his attempt to
 illustrate the merits of a cognitive structures approach to bomb
 history.  This choice revealed, more than anything else, his lack
 of awareness of much of the evidence now available--evidence which
 clarifies that Stimson did not play the central role in bomb
 decision-making that he was once thought to have played, and
 which reveals Stimson's position on U.S. policies in the last
 months of the war to be quite different from those predicted by
 Bonnett's "Psychology of Combat" schema.  In trying to argue
 that Stimson's approach to the use of the bomb was dictated by this
 particular schema, he failed to consider the quite accessible
 evidence (including that which is presented in _The Decision_,
 the subject of his review) which documents Stimson's progression
 away from a rigid position on use of the bomb and toward an
 aggressive position in favor of assuring the Japanese as a
 potential way to remove the last stumbling block to surrender.  He
 also ignored evidence from the diary of Assistant Secretary of War
 John McCloy who was, in fact, the "maverick" who
 appears to have been quite successful in his attempt to persuade
 Stimson to envision a sequence of events that did not only involve
 the use of atomic bombs on cities without any warning.  In
 turn, this lack of awareness not only raised questions about his
 ability to present new approaches, but also, specfically, undercuts
 his argument for what might be a useful means for
 enriching bomb discussions.
      I, like Bonnett, am frustrated with the state of the bomb
 debate.  And I agree that there are ways discussions of A-bomb
 history in general and the U.S. decision in particular, could be
 enhanced.  Indeed, just in terms of analogies and schemas, I
 suspect there are others that would actually emerge as influential
 on the events and decisions leading up to the atomic bombings (the
 influence of Truman's experience with political machines, for
 example; or even Byrnes' "can't be so many cooks" approach to
 personal politics and the possible translation of this into a
 "dictate our terms" approach to global politics during this
 period.)  However, until we can agree on the shape of the body of
 evidentiary materials and everyone reaches more or less common
 ground in terms of knowledge of the details, new theoretical
 frameworks will, unfortunately, have little enlightening impact on
 bomb debates.
      Finally, when critics demonstrate such a high level of
 unfamiliarity with the evidentiary details of the book, how can we
 hope to move from warlike, generalized debates to intelligent
 discussions about interpretative differences?  While one may
 disagree with Alperovitz's interpretation, in a reviewing his book,
 one should, at the very least, be expected to demonstrate
 familiarity with the evidence it presents, especially that which
 bears on specific points of criticism.  Let me cite just a few
 specific examples:
      1.Nowhere in _The Decision_ is the Kwantung Army
 inappropriately characterized as "an elite force" (Bergerud,
 H-Diplo, 10 Oct. 1996)
      On page 85, in reference to the role that Soviet entry was
 initially to play--as determined early in the war--it says "U.S.
 officials initially wanted the Red Army to attack as soon
      as possible in order to pin down the vaunted Japanese Kwantung
 Army on the China mainland."
      On page 418, it states the "once formidable Japanese Kwantung
 Army, (now 'bled white of trained units and of first-line
 equipment.')" (quoting from Raymond Garthoff's 1969 study, "The
 Soviet Manchurian Campaign, August 1945 in _Military Affairs_.)
 2. The text in _The Decision_ on page 651 reads: "the August
 intercepts which now showed 'unanimous determination' to seek
 surrender through Moscow."  This is a straightforward
 reference to both the content, and the interpretation of an August
 2 cable from Japanese Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo to Ambassador
 to Moscow Naotake Sato, intercepted and reported in
 MAGIC on August 2 and 3, discussed on pp. 406 and 412 of _The
 Decision_.  Just to avoid misunderstanding, I will quote the cable.
 In the first half of the cable, reported in MAGIC on
 August 2, Togo wrote:
      At present, in accordance with the Imperial will, there is a
 _unanimous determination_      to seek the good offices of the
 Russians in _ending the war_, to make concrete terms a
      matter between Japan and Russia, and to send Prince Konoye,
 who has the deep trust of the Emperor, to carry on discussions....
 In the second half, reported on August 3, he wrote:
      The Premier and the leaders of the Army are now concentrating
 all their attention on this one point.
 MAGIC cryptoanalysts, in reporting this, noted "Japanese Army's
 interest in peace negotiations," and explained:
      The second half of Foreign Minister Togo's 2 August message to
 Ambassador Sato--now available--contains the first statement to
 appear in the traffic that _the Japanese Army is interested in the
 effort to end the war_ with Soviet assistance.
 Furthermore, the above evidence from Brown's diary entry of August
 3 suggests that the semantic differences between "seeking peace"
 and "seeking surrender," are more important to
 Brian villa than they were to U.S. leaders at the time. (H-Diplo,
 October 14, 1996 and H-Diplo, October 28, 1996)
 3. I can think of no evidence documenting Averell Harriman's and
 Harry Hopkins' opposition to assuring the Japanese that the emperor
 would not be removed upon unconditional surrender.
 Indeed, I find it strange that if Harriman had strong feelings, why
 would he not have expressed them to McCloy when he discussed
 Forrestal's opinion, or, if he did, why did McCloy not make
 a note of it, considering he had his own strong opinions about
 offering assurances?  As for Hopkins, he had a fairly thorough
 discussion with Stalin when he met with him in Moscow in
 May and, neither at this time, nor when he reported Stalin's views
 on the matter back to Washington did he stake out a position
 against offering assurances.(20)  I would like to know
 if there is specific evidence on the views of these two officials,
 as well as evidence documenting that they made these views known to
 anyone. (ref, Bergerud, H-Diplo, 10 Oct. 1996)
                            Endnotes for Part II
 (1) Bonnett, H-Diplo, September 25, 1996.  Memorandum for Colonel
 Stimson, from McCloy, 29 June 1945. National Archives, Washington,
 D.C., Record Group 107, Entry 74A, Stimson
 Safe File, Box 8, "Japan (After Dec. 7/41)."  (_The Decision_, p.
 (2) Memorandum, SUBJECT: Timing of Proposed Demand for Japanese
 Surrender, 29 June 1945, National Archives, Washington, D.C.,
 Record Group 107, Entry 74A, Stimson Safe File,
 Box 8, "Japan (After Dec. 7/41)."
 (3) Stimson Diary, July 2, 1945, Sterling Library, Yale University,
 New Haven, CT; also on microfilm at the Library of Congress
 Manuscripts and Archives Division, Washington, D.C.
 (_The Decision_, pp. 76-78.)
 (4) FRUS, Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), Vol. II, pp. 1265-67.
 (_The Decision_, pp. 235-36.)
 (5) See _The Decision_, pp. 390-99, and citations therein.
 (6) McCloy Diary, July 30, 1945.
 (7) See _The Decision_, especially pp. 714-15.
 (8) Bergerud, H-Diplo, 10 Oct. 1996, 14 Oct. 1996; Villa, H-Diplo,
 14 Oct. 1996.
 (9) See _The Decision_, especially pp. 46, 60, 65, 67-70, 78,
 305-06 and references to Grew's memoirs, Stimson's Diary, McCloy's
 various recollections, the June 18 meeting minutes.
 (10) Brown characterized this cable as "a message which agreed and
 accepted proposal to deal with present japanese government to
 maintain order on Japan."  He comments, "This message
 would have led to the crucifixion of the President."  This comment
 has been interpreted by many analysts as reflecting Truman's
 position on unconditional surrender--that clarification would lead
 to a domestic political crucifixion of sorts.  While Truman may
 have had some concern along these lines, evidence has not yet been
 found.  In fact, Brown's comment seems to be in
 reference to the specific wording of Leahy's message as drafted,
 and, moreover, in no way indicates that this was Truman's judgment.
 Furthermore, there is no indication that his comment
 went beyond Leahy's message to the greater issue at hand. Brown
 Diary ("WB's Book"), August 10, 1945.  Robert Muldrow Cooper
 Library, Clemson University, Clemson, SC, Byrnes Papers,
 Folder 602.  (_The Decision_, pp. 417-18.)
 (11) Brown Diary (from Messer interview), August 10, 1945, for full
 reference see _The Decision_, p. 734, n. 9. (_The Decision_, pp.
 (12) ibid.
 (13) Stimson Diary, August 10, 1945.
 (14) McCloy Diary, July 16, 17 & 27, 1945, Amherst College
 Archives, Amherst, MA. (_The
 Decision_, p. 234.)
 (15) Brown Diary, July 17, 1945. Robert Muldrow Cooper Library,
 Clemson University, Clemson, SC, Byrnes Papers, Folder 54(1). (_The
 Decision_, p. 237.)
 (16) Truman, _Off the Record_, pp. 53-4. (_The Decision_, p.
 (17) Ehrman, _Grand Strategy_, p. 302-03. (_The Decision_, p. 243.)
 (18) Walter Brown, August 3, 1945. Robert Muldrow Cooper Library,
 Clemson University, Clemson, SC, Byrnes Papers, Folder 602. (_The
 Decision_, p. 415.)
 (19)Memorandum for the President from Chief of Staff [Marshall],
 July 25, 1945.  National Archives, Washington, D.C., Record Group
 165, Entry 421, "ABC 387 Japan (15 Feb. 45)."
 (20) See  U.S. Department of Defense, _The Entry of the Soviet
 Union into the War Against Japan_, p. 74 (_The Decision_, p. 55.)